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Edna Louise Dunn Trust v.
Commissioner: A Movement from the 5
Year Rule to the Device Clause under

Section 355

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
if a shareholder receives stock of a controlled corporation from a
distributing corporation under certain conditions, then no gain or loss
will be recognized on the distributed stock.' Nonrecognition facilitates
corporate separations as restructuring can occur without an immediate
tax consequence.2 But a tax-free transaction of this nature may be
abused without some outer limits. 3 A corporation may reorganize with
its primary motivation being to bail-out 4 profits and earnings without

1. Whenever property is sold or disposed of, gain or loss is realized. I.R.C. §
1001(a)(1986). Ordinarily this gain or loss must be recognized; that is, taken into
income and have a tax consequence. I.R.C. § 1001(c)(1986). Certain exceptions from
this rule of recognition are provided by the Code and § 355 is one such nonrecognition
situation.
2. Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate
Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1194, 1195 (1968).
3. E.g., Lee, The "Active Business" Test of § 355: Implications of a Trilogy
of Revenue Rulings, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 251, 252 (1974).
4. E.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 105 (1977). Bail-outs defined as "schemes
to transform corporate distributions that normally would appear in ordinary income
form into proceeds that appear to be capital gains."
For example, corporation X has two stockholders, A and B and $10 in its
corporate solution. Corporation X could declare a dividend of $10 and distribute $5
each to A and B. Upon receipt, A and B would include the $5 in their gross income
and it should be taxable as ordinary income. See, I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a)(1986).
But suppose corporation X takes the $10 and buys all the stock in corporation Y
and then distributes this stock to A and B. If this distribution is tax-free, then A and
B are better off. Since they can now sell the stock of corporation Y at capital gains
rates without sacrificing their interest in corporation X.
Schneider, Internal Revenue Code Before and After The Tax Reform Act of
1986-A Study in the Regulation of Corporate Tax Bailouts, 39 Okla. L. Rev. (1986) referring to bail-outs: "The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has altered the meaning
of this term, since the preferential capital gains treatment has been eliminated.
Bailouts can and still should occur after 1986, but investors now attempt to defer
tax on ordinary income, instead of converting ordinary income into capital gain."
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any immediate tax consequence.' The purpose of section 355 is to
distinguish between bail-outs and legitimate corporate restructurings
6
and only to accord nonrecognition treatment to the latter.
Basically, section 355 contains two safeguards against sham sep'arations: the device clause and the active business test. 7 The device
clause provides that nonrecognition is not afforded transactions which
are used principally as a "device" to distribute profits and earnings.'
The active business test provides that both corporations must be
engaged in the "active conduct of a trade or business" for five years
9
prior to the distribution and immediately following the distribution.
Although section 355 provides these limits to prevent corporate
tax bail-outs, they often result in the denial of nonrecognition
treatment to legitimate corporate restructuring. 0 The problem is in
the statute itself. Although the 5 year period is an arbitrary meas5. E.g., Whitman, supra note 2, at 1195.
6. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1968): "The general purpose
of the section 355 was to distinguish corporate fission from the distribution of
earnings and profits." Spheeris v. Commissioner, 461 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1972).
"The purpose of the statute is to deter taxpayers from utilizing corporate reorganizations as a means of tax avoidance rather than accomplishment of legitimate business
purposes, by transforming corporate earnings normally taxable as ordinary income
into earnings qualified for capital gains treatment."
7. Lee, supra note 3, at 253.
8. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (1986) This section provides that:
the transaction was not used principally as a device for the distribution of
earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock
or securities in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged by
all or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to an arrangement
negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be construed
to mean that the transaction was used principally as a device).
9. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C) & (b) (1986). § 355(b)(1) provides that: Requirements
as to active business.(1) In general. - Subsection (a) shall apply only if either (A) the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation (or, if stock
of more than one controlled corporation is distributed, each of such
corporations), is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active
conduct of a trade or business, or (B) immediately before the distribution,
the distributing corporation had no assets other than stock or securities in
the controlled corporations and each of the controlled corporations is
engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade
or business.
§ 355(b)(2)(B) provides that: such trade or business has been actively conducted
throughout the 5-year period ending on the date of distribution.
10. See, e.g., Lyons, Some Problems in Corporate Separations Under the 1954
Code, 12 TAx L. Rv. 15, 21 (1956).
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urement, I it' is still a formidable obstacle to nonrecognition distributions.' 2 Moreover, the statute does not define the 5 year rule
adequately.II The 4 year rule requires that the controlled corporation
be in the "active conduct of a trade or4 business," yet defines neither
active conduct nor trade or business.1
Edna Louise Dunn Trust v. Commissioner5 is significant as it
addresses yet another undefined term of the 5 year rule: the controlled
corporation. In this case, the issue was whether the 5 year rule only
applied to the controlled corporation as a whole entity or to its
underlying holdings as well. 16 The Tax Court held that the controlled
corporation, not its subsidiary, must have a five year business history. 17 Moreover, this narrow application of the 5 year rule shifts
emphasis to the device clause, the more appropriate provision for
evaluating bail-outs. 8
Since this decision, Congress has enacted the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Section 355 was not changed. However, the preferential tax on
capital gains was eliminated. 9 Since capital gains is no longer available
to shareholders, perhaps corporations and shareholders will be more
inclined to utilize section 355. After 1986, the decision in Dunn Trust
may have the potential of affecting a greater number of taxpayers.
II. BACKGROUND
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code provides nonrecognition treatment for stock distributions to shareholders during corporate
11. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
4025, 4229. The House draft required a 10 year period.
12. Lyons, supra note 10, at 19. "It is important to note that section 355 calls
for absolute compliance with all the specified requirements without any room for
qualification of a transaction which, although not a device for the distribution of
earnings, fails to meet each of the other specified requirements."
13. The proper definition of the 5 year rule is at issue in Edna Louise Dunn
Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. (P-H) 86.46 (April 17, 1986). E.g., Whitman, supra
note 2, at 1209, referring to section 355: "Such was the Senate's solution to the
separation problem - a highly rigid, highly technical provision allowing little leeway
in application, and full of new and undefined terms that promised extensive litigation."
14. See Infra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
15. 86 T.C. (P-H) 86.46 (April 17, 1986).
16. Id. at 380.
17. Id. at 381-82.
18. Whitman, supra note 2, at 1229: "(I)t would seem sounder to start the
analysis with device, eliminating the definitional tangle altogether."
19. Tax Reform Act of 1986. H.R. 3838. September 18, 1986. Section 301
repeals the exclusion for long-term capital gains of individuals. Section 302 provides
for a 28 percent capital gains rate for individuals.
CoNo. & ADMIN. Nnws
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separations. 20 There are three types of corporate separations: spinoffs, split-offs and split-ups. In a spin-off shareholders receive stock
of a subsidiary while still retaining their stock interest in the distributing corporation. 2' In a split-off, shareholders of a corporation
exchange some or all of their stock in the distributing corporation for
the stock of the subsidiary. 22 Finally, in a split-up, shareholders of a
corporation exchange all of their stock in that corporation for the
stock of its subsidiaries, and the distributing corporation dissolves.2
Each separation effectuates the same ends: to divide the original
corporate solution into two or more corporations with the original
shareholders owning stock in one or all the corporations.2
By 1924, all three of these corporate separations had been made
exempt from immediate taxation.25 Congress decided that corporate
readjustment did not result in a taxable transaction to the individual
shareholders. 26 The shareholders still had the same equity Interest in
the corporate assets after the separation as before. As a group, the
shareholders owned the same amount of assets as before, just the
corporate form had changed.2 This exemption from immediate taxation facilitated readjustments which were necessary for the efficient
use of corporate assets. For example, the original corporation could
be divided into functional units which presumably could produce
more income individually than as a group. 28
While promoting corporate efficiency and genuine reorganizations, the nonrecognition status of separations was also an attractive
20. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1) (1986).
21. Treas. Reg. 1.355-(1)(b) (1955). This resembles a stock dividend.
22. Treas. Reg. 1.355-(1)(b) (1955). This resembles a stock redemption.
23. Treas. Reg 1.355-(1)(b) (1955).

24. I.R.C. § 355(a)(2) (1986) provided that non pro rata separations can qualify
under § 355.
25. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1918); splitups and split-offs qualified for nonrecognition treatment. Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256-57 (1924); nonrecognition was extended to spin-offs.
26. E.g., Young, Corporate Separations: Some Revenue Rulings Under Section
355, 71 HARv. L. REv. 843, 844 (1967); "Congress, believing that such readjustments
behind the corporate walls did not mark an appropriate time to tax the shareholder,
added the reorganization provisions to the law in order to postpone the recognition
of gain or loss in such cases."
27. E.g., Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 495 (9th Cir. 1967), aff'd 391
U.S. 83 (1968). "The fundamental basis of nonrecognition of gain or loss under
section 355 is that no tax should be imposed when the same people continue to own
the same businesses with only formal changes in the business organization."
28. B.BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS, 13.01 (4th ed. 1979).
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means for avoiding taxes. 29 Separations could be used to bail-out
dividends. 30 Historically in a bail-out, the parent corporation indirectly
distributes earnings and profits to its shareholders with the distribution
ultimately receiving capital gains treatment." For example, the parent
corporation could incorporate a subsidiary. With its earnings, the
parent corporation could buy all the stock of the subsidiary and
distribute this stock to its shareholders. Ordinarily, a direct distribution would be deemed a dividend and taxed as ordinary income33
immediately.3 2 If the corporation and stock purchase are tax-free, 34
then the distribution would not be recognized for tax purposes.
Subsequently, the shareholders could sell the subsidiary's stock and
receive capital gains treatment without sacrificing any of their interest
in the parent corporation."
The classic case of bail-out by separation is Gregory v. Helver3
6
ing. Mrs. Evelyn F. Gregory owned the United Mortgage Corporation which held stock in the Monitor Corporation. Mrs. Gregory had
found a buyer for the Monitor stock and wished to sell the stock
herself. If United Mortgage distributed the Monitor stock to her this
would be a stock dividend taxable as ordinary income. To avoid this
tax consequence, Mrs. Gregory formed a new corporation, Averill
29. E.g., Whitman, supra note 2, at 1195.
30. See supra note 4.
31. Through 1968, a taxpayer other than a corporation could deduct from gross
income 60 percent of the amount of his/her net capital gains. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1986).
See, Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution
and Reform, 87 YALE LJ. 90, 104-05 (1977):"Capital gains was first given preferential
treatment by the Revenue Act of 1921. The purpose was to increase tax revenues by
encouraging the sale of capital assets. Previously, the sale of capital assets was
retarded by the overwhelming tax consequences of gains accrued over a series of
years." See also supra note 19.
32. E.g., B. BITTI ER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 7.01: "(A) corporate

distribution is a 'dividend' that must be included in the recipient's gross income
under §§ 301(c)(1) and 61(a)(7) if, and to the extent that, it comes out of the earnings
and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913 or out of earnings
and profits of the taxable year. Most distributions of most corporations fall well
within this category of taxable 'dividends' and hence are taxed as ordinary income
to the shareholder."
33. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D) (1986). If corporation X acquires the stock of
corporation Y, corporation A must gain control of corporation Y. The transaction
is tax-free to the extent that it qualifies as a reorganization under I.R.C. §§ 354, 355,
or 356.
34. I.R.C. § 355 (1954).
35. Capital gains are afforded on the sale of a capital asset. Here, the
shareholders still own their original capital investment.
36. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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Corporation. She persuaded United Mortgage to exchange the Monitor stock for the new Averill stock and then distribute the Averill
stock to her, as a tax-free reorganization under the Revenue Act of
1928. Three days later, Mrs. Gregory dissolved Averill and had all its
assets, namely the Monitor stock, distributed to herself. Mrs. Gregory

then sold the Monitor stock, reporting no gain. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency in income tax. The Board of Tax Appeals set
aside the deficiency since the transaction was within the letter of the

law.37 The Second Circuit
scheme was not within the
Supreme Court affirmed.
purpose" in the transaction

reversed, finding that Mrs. Gregory's
exemptions intended by Congress. 8 The
Justice Sutherland found no "business
and characterized it as "an elaborate and

devious form of conveyance masquerading as a reorganization. ' 3 9
Mrs. Gregory was denied nonrecognition treatment, but only because
of judicial gloss. 40
Responding to the Gregory scheme, Congress set out to reform

the separation provisions. 4' In 1934, spin-offs were removed from
nonrecognition treatment while split-offs and split-ups retained non-

recognition status .42 In 1951, Congress revived the spin-offs as taxfree transactions. 43 It was not until 1954 that massive reforms were

enacted."

In an effort to distinguish between genuine and sham corporate
readjustments, Congress drafted Section 355 of the Code. Section 355
contained two safeguards against sham separations: the device clause
and the active business test. 4 The device clause provides that nonrecognition is not afforded transactions which are primarily used to
37. Evenly F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932).
38. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
39. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
40. Schneider, supra note 4, at _.
41. See e.g., Whitman, supra note 2, at 1196 n.9, referring to Gregory v.
Helvering: "This case, well known for originating the 'business purpose' doctrine,
is also the inspiration for the 'device' clause in § 355 of the 1954 Code.
42. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680 (1934).
43. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 317, 65 Stat. 452, 493 (1951) allowed one
corporation to spin-off the stock of another corporation if:
(i) the distributed stock was not preferred stock (ii) both the distributing and
controlled corporations "continued the active conduct of a trade or business" after reorganization; and (iii) the controlled corporation was not
"used principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits"
to its shareholders or to shareholders of the distributing corporation.
44. I.R.C. § 355 (1954).
45. See supra note 3.

1986:113]

THE DEVICE CLA USE OF SECTION 355

distribute profits and earnings.4 The separation must be furthering
some legitimate business purpose. 47 The active business test requires
that both the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation
be engaged in the "active conduct of a trade or business" for five
years prior to the distribution (the 5-year rule) and immediately
following the distribution. 4 Further, the stock of the controlled
corporation must not have been acquired by the distributing corporation in a transaction in which it recognized gain or loss within five
years of its distribution. In this situation, the stock of the controlled
corporation would be treated as "other property," thereby forcing
49
gain recognition .
Although the device clause seems to attack bail-outs in a straightforward fashion, past litigation has centered on the active business
test.5 0 The active conduct of a trade or business for a period of five
years prior to distribution is an inescapable hurdle for any separation." As a result, the focus has been on "questions of definition whether a certain business has been 'active' or not - rather than on
transactional analysis - whether any particular separation should be
allowed tax-free treatment.' '52
Moreover, there has been much uncertainty under section 355.
In IsabelA. Elliott v. Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit noted "(w)hat
constitutes a trade or business is not defined in section 355 or
anywhere else in the Internal Revenue Code." '5 3 In Estate of Thorval

J. Lockwood, the Tax Court noted "what is meant by the 'active
conduct of a trade or business' is nowhere explained in the Code. ' 5 4
The Service helped to fill this void by issuing regulations." These
regulations were often more restrictive than the statute56 and some
46. See supra note 8.
47. See supra note 41.
48. See supra note 9.
49. I.R.C. § 355(a)(3)(B) (1986) disallows nonrecognition if:
stock of the controlled corporation acquired by the distributing corporation by

reason of any transaction which occurs within 5 years of the distribution of
such stock and in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part,
shall not be treated as stock of such controlled corporation, but as other
property.
50. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3, at 253.
51. E.g., Whitman, supra note 2, at 1211.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

32 T.C. 283, 289 (1959).
33 T.C.M. (P-H) 1350, 1357 (1964), rev'd, 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965).
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1 to 1.355-5 (1955).
E.g., Lyons supra note 13, at 21, referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(c)

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

courts have refused to follow them." For example in King v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit stated, "We decline to rest our determination upon these imprecise regulations, and instead rely upon the
' 58
language of the statute itself and its legislative history.
Thus the undefined terms of section 355 have largely gained their

meaning from court decisions. In Bonsall v. Commissioner,9 the

Second Circuit found "(o)nly long application may completely clarify
the difficult terminology of section 355. " 60
This emphasis on judicial interpretation is the direct result of

legislative inactivity. 6' Since section 355 was enacted in 1954, no
changes have been made by Congress. 62 Thus the Dunn Trust decision

will take its place along with other judicial definitions of section 355
terminology.

(1955): "The regulations define a trade or business as consisting of 'a specific existing
group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning income or profit from
only such group of activities, and the activities included in such group must include
every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the process of earning income
or profit from such group.' The language of the statute does not appear to require
so strict a construction."
57. See, e.g., Edmond P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd per curium, 289

F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961) (the Tax Court held that Treas. Reg. 1.355(a) (1955) was
invalid).
58. 458 F.2d 245 (1972).
59. For example, in Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1960),
cert denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972), the First Circuit held: "It is our view that in order
to be an active trade or business under Section 355 a corporation must engage in
entrepreneurial endeavors of such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively
distinguish its operations from mere investments."; Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1962) (There must be a valid business purpose to
support both the division of the corporate entity and the distribution of the new
corporate stock to the shareholders). Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187
(9th Cir. 1965) (Even if there is no tax avoidance motive, a separation having no
business purpose does not qualify under § 355).
60. 317 F.2d 61, 65 (1963).
61. Even though there has been substantial criticism of section 355, no changes
have been made since its enactment in 1954. For criticism, see generally, Whitman,

supra note 2; Lee, supra note 3; Lyons, supra note 10, Cohen, Reconciling Business
Purpose with Bail-out Prevention: Federal Tax Policy and Corporate Divisions, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1976); Lee, FunctionalDivisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rafferty 27 TAx L. REV. 453 (1972); Morris, Combining
Divisive and Amalgamating Reorganizations - Section 355 Fails Again, 46 TEX. L.
REv. 315 (1968); Masse, Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection
with Reorganization, 22 TAX L. REv. 439 (1967). Young, Corporate Separations:
Some Revenue Rulings Under Section 355, 71 HARv. L. REV. 843 (1958).

62. No changes were made in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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III.
A.

EDNA LOUISE DUNN TRUST V. COMMISSIONER

FACTS OF THE CASE

On August 24, 1982, a longstanding antitrust suit against American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) was settled. 63 Under
the terms of the decision AT&T was to break up its operations
64
through an agreed plan of reorganization and divestiture.
Prior to this break up, the AT&T infrastructure was composed
of a network of holding companies and operating companies with
many parent-subsidiary relationships. For simplicity and the purposes
of this case, AT&T corporate structure can be divided into seven
regional holding companies (RHCs) and twenty-two Bell operating

65
companies (BOCs).

Pursuant to the plan of reorganization and divestiture, the BOCs
were placed in the control of the seven RHCs. Thus, AT&T, which
owned the RHC stock, gave each RHC the stock of the BOCs in its
66
geographic region. In return, each RHC gave AT&T its stock.
In January of 1984, AT&T stockholders received a distribution
of the newly acquired stock of each of the seven RHCs in an amount
reflecting their investment in AT&T. A trust in the name of Edna
Louise Dunn (Dunn Trust) held 400 shares of AT&T and thus received
67
40 shares of each of the seven RHCs.
At issue in Dunn Trust is the characterization, for purposes of
section 355, of the 40 shares of one of the RHCs, Pacific Telesis
Group (PacTel Group). 6 AT&T received the PacTel stock (here, the
63. See, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
64. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 138. The reorganization involved
the division of AT&T into regions.AT&T was to divest itself from a group of
subsidiaries known as the Bell System, whose principal business was furnishing
communication services and equipment.
65. The Bell System included 22 Bell operating companies (BOCs) which were
direct or indirect subsidiaries of AT&T, Western Electric Co., Inc., Bell Telephone
Laboratories, Inc., and other companies. AT&T's seven regional holding companies
(RHCs) were American Information Technologies Corp., Bell Atlantic Corp., Bell
South Corp., NYNEX Corp., Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell Corp. and
U.S. West, Inc. See, Dunn Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. (P-H) 86.46, at 378
(April 17, 1986).

66. Id. at 379-80.
67. Id. at 378. See AT&T, INFORMATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS 20
(November 8, 1983); Each AT&T shareholder received one share of stock in each of

the seven RHCs for every ten shares of AT&T common stock held.
68. Id. at 380.
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Reorganization

Distribution

I

AT&T

BOC
stock

RHC
stock

each
RHC

AT&T

I
4

RHC

stock

AT&T
stockholders

ROC) in exchange for Pacific stock (here, the BOC). 69 The Pacific

stock had been acquired within the last 5 years in a transaction
recognizing gain or loss. 70 According to the literal terms of section
355, the distribution of this stock would lead to a recognition of gain
or loss to the recipient. 7' However, Dunn Trust argued that it did not

72
receive the Pacific stock but rather they received the PacTel stock.

The controversy was whether the 5 year rule applies to PacTel only
as a whole entity or also to the underlying activities of PacTel, namely
73

the Pacific stock.
The history of the Pacific stock is as follows. Prior to the antitrust

reorganization, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or74
dered AT&T to restructure and separate the functions of the BOCs.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 379. The Pacific shareholders recognized gain or loss because AT&T
did not acquire control of Pacific within the meaning of I.R.C. § 368(c) (1986).
AT&T did not acquire any of Pacific's nonvoting preferred stock.
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The Pacific stock would be
"other property."
72. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) 86.46, at 380 (April 17, 1986).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 379 (citing Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commissioner's
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 (1980), as
modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom., Computer &
Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied
sub nom., Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
461 U.S. 938 (1983)).
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Pursuant to the FCC mandate, AT&T entered into a merger agreement
in November of 1981.75 The corporations involved were AT&T, Pacific
and Pacific Transition Corporation (Transition), a newly formed,
wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T. 76 Transition merged into Pacific
exchanging AT&T stock and money for Pacific stock. 77 AT&T did
not acquire control over Pacific, thus the Pacific stockholders recog7
nized gain or loss in the merger. 1
Subsequently, through the Plan of Reorganization resulting from
the antitrust suit, AT&T was allowed to amend Pacific's Articles of
Incorporation and thereby acquire control of Pacific. 79 In October of
1983, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that this amendment qualified
as a reorganization and no gain or loss was to be recognized by AT&T
80
or Pacific stockholders.

In Dunn Trust, the taxpayer and the Service agreed that AT&T
did not have control over Pacific until 1983, so this stock was
improperly aged.8 ' What was being disputed was the Service's determination that the portion of the PacTel stock attributed to the Pacific
stock-swap should be recognized and taxable. 2 On this basis, the
Service found a deficiency in Dunn Trust's federal income tax return
of $29.64.83 Dunn Trust asserted that this was an erroneous interpretation of section 355 and the 5 year rule. Dunn Trust filed this suit

75. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 379 (April 17, 1986).
76. Id.
77. Id. Pacific stockholders received .35 shares of AT&T common stock in
exchange for each share of Pacific common stock and $60 in cash for each share of
Pacific 6 percent voting preferred stock.
78. See supra note 70.
79. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 379 (April 17, 1986): "The
Plane of Reorganization provided that the Articles of Incorporation of Pacific would
be amended to convert the one outstanding share of Pacific voting common stock
into 224,504,982 shares of voting common stock (the number of common shares
outstanding prior to the merger), and to modify the rights of the nonvoting preferred
stock to entitle each share to one vote per share with cumulative voting for directors
as authorized by California law."
80. Id. On October 6, 1983, the Service ruled the amendment to Pacific's
Articles of Incorporation qualified as a reorganization within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(l)(E) and therefore no gain or loss would be recognized.
81. Id. at 380. See supra text accompanying not 49. The stock was "improperly
aged" as it was acquired within 5 years of the PacTel stock distribution.
82. See supra note 49. The Service determined the Pacific stock was "other
property."
83. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 378 (April 17, 1986).
84. Id. at 380.
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to eliminate the deficiency.
B.

DECISION & RATIONALE:

In a majority opinion by Judge Tannenwald, the Tax Court held
that no portion of the PacTel stock distributed to AT&T's stockholders constituted "other property." 85 In the five years prior to the
distribution, none of the PacTel stock was acquired by AT&T in a
transaction recognizing gain or loss. 8 6 Since the PacTel stock met the
requirements of Section 355 and no gain or loss was to be recognized
on the distribution. Thus, there was no deficiency in federal tax return
of Dunn Trust.87
Judge Tannenwald addressed each of the two Service arguments
individually. First, the Service argued that Pacific was a "controlled
corporation" of AT&T for the purposes of section 355.88 If this was
held valid, then the Pacific stock would constitute "other property." 89
AT&T acquired all of the Pacific stock through a merger agreement
in which gain or loss was recognized. 90 Further, the merger agreement
occurred within five years of the distribution at issue here. 9' Since the
Pacific stock is "other property," the distribution of the PacTel stock
would not meet the requirements of a § 355 distribution, thus gain or
loss must be recognized by the recipient shareholders. 92 The court
found this argument to be erroneous from two points of view. First,
from a literal standpoint, Pacific was not a "controlled corporation"
of AT&T since AT&T did not own the Pacific stock prior to the
distribution. 93 AT&T had exchanged the Pacific stock for the PacTel
stock, which was the stock that was ultimately distributed. There
could be no distribution, which is a fundamental element of this case,
without AT&T first relinquishing the Pacific stock. AT&T could not
control a corporation without owning its stock.94 Turning from the
85. Id. at 383. The court held that the PacTel stock was properly aged according
to the 5 year rule and AT&T had acquired control of PacTel within the meaning of
I.R.C. 368(c) (1954). See supra note 49.
86. Id. at 380.
87. Id. at 384.
88. Id. at 380; I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(D)(ii).
89. See supra note 49.
90. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 379 (April 17, 1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 381-82.
94. I.R.C. § 368(c) (1984) the term "control" means the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of the corporation.
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literal meaning of "controlled corporation," the court looked to the
legislative history. 95 In 1954, the Senate Finance Committee amended
the Senate version of section 355(a)(3) to read:
"stock of a controlled corporation acquired by the distributing
corporation within 5 years of its distribution. IN A TRANSACTION in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in
part, shall not be treated as stock of such controlled corporation, but as other property. 96
The Conference Committee further modified the phrase
"within 5 years of its distribution, IN A TRANSACTION"
to read "BY REASON OF ANY TRANSACTION which
occurs within 5 years of the distribution of such stock." 97 The
explanation of this modification was to broaden the range of
stock purchases which could justifiably constitute "other property. "98 This modification prevented a distributing corporation
from acquiring additional controlled corporation stock through
a tax-free transaction with a related corporation and then
distributing all the stock on a valid nonrecognition basis. 99 The
Service argued that Pacific, PacTel and AT&T are related
corporations and were meant to be encompassed in this modification. 1°° The court pointed out that with or without the
modification, section 355(c)(3)(B) required a distribution of
the controlled corporation's stock. Regardless of the close
relationship of the three corporations, Pacific's stock was
never distributed.' 0' From Section 355's literal reading or
historic development, the Tax Court could not find that the
Pacific stock was "other property." The status of "other
property" attaches to stock which is distributed. The Pacific
stock was never distributed.
The Service's second argument is that the overall statutory framework of section 355 requires that the underlying subsidiary have its
95. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 381 (April 17, 1986).
96. Id. (quoting H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1622 CONG. REc. 122 (1954)).
(Emphasis in original).
97. Id. (quoting H. REPT. No 2543, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954)). (Emphasis

added).

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 381 (April 17, 1986). The court
recognized that the Service might have a valid argument here since the statute and
the modification were "sufficiently ambiguous."
101. Id. at 381-82.
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own 5 year business history. 0 2 Under section 355(b)(2)(A), a controlled
corporation can actually satisfy the 5 year rule through a subsidiary.0 3
For example, assume corporation Y is a subsidiary of corporation X
and corporation Y is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business. If substantially all of corporation X's assets consist of the
stock of corporation Y, then corporation X will be treated as engaged
in the active conduct of a trade or business. The Service argued that
since a subsidiary can fulfill the active business requirement of the
distributing or controlled corporation, then the stock of the subsidiary4
'
should be investigated for its potential status as "other property."'
Without such a requirement, the statute would not be symmetrical. 05
The court found it difficult to make this "analytical jump." ' 0 6 If the
statute is as inconsistent as the Service believed, then Congress must
have been aware of this dichotomy and intended such a result.'0 7 The
court held that unless this narrow application of other property
"would lead to absurd results . . . or would thwart the obvious

purpose of the statute"' 08 it would not adopt a different construction.
The purpose of section 355 is to prevent the conversion of earnings
and profits into a sham stock distribution which receives favorable
nonrecognition treatment. AT&T did not bail-out liquid assets when
it spun-off PacTel.' 9 The Pacific stock has still remained in the
corporate solution. The question to recognize a gain or loss must be
proceeded by an actual distribution. No such distribution has occurred." 0
Lastly, the court noted future problems which would result if the
Service's reasoning were adopted. What happens when the Pacific
stock is finally distributed? What value does it have? Should it be
"tainted" in a subsequent 355 distribution? What if more than one
class of stock is involved? If a subsidiary is required to have its own
5 year history, what about a subsidiary of a subsidiary?"'
102. Id. at 382.

103. I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (1986). A corporation shall be treated as being
engaged in the active conduct of trade or business if "substantially all its assets"
consist of stock of a controlled subsidiary which is so engaged.
104. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 382 (April 17, 1986). See supra
note 49 for the statutory definition of "other property."
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.(quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941)).
109. 86 T.C. (T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46 at 383.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Judge Tannenwald concluded that none of the Service's arguments had persuaded him to believe the purpose of the statute was
being frustrated by the court's interpretation.112 If the Service felt that
there was a bail-out and that section 355 had not envisioned this sort
of transaction, the Service could challenge the transaction as a device." 3 The Service had declined this line of argument conceding that
the implementation of the FCC order and the antitrust decree were
valid business purposes." 4 Having conceded that AT&T was acting
under a valid business purpose, the Service should not be allowed to
5
circumvent the device clause by expanding the 5 year rule."
C.

ANALYSIS:

It ordinarily is to the advantage of a corporation and its shareholders to distribute stock to the shareholders on a nonrecognition
basis." 6 The recognition of gain or loss can have substantial effects
on the fair market value of both the controlled corporation's and the
distributing corporation's stock." 7 On the other hand, corporations
cannot be allowed to bail-out profits and earnings through tax-free
8
restructuring. "
Section 355 curtails the temptation to restructure principally for
the tax advantage of nonrecognition distributions." 9 But it should
follow that restructuring for other reasons should not be prohibited
by section 355. On this basis, the decision in Dunn Trust has put the
application of section 355 in its appropriate context.
In Dunn Trust, the Tax Court held that the Pacific was not the
"controlled corporation" to which section 355 was applicable.12° This
112. Id.
113. Id. at 383-84. See supra note 8 for the statutory definition of a device.
114. 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46 at 384. See Schneider, supra note 4, at _:
"(B)usiness purpose should be evidence of whether or not the separation is a 'device'
for distributing the profits of any of the participating corporations authority to the
contrary notwithstanding." See also, Lester v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 947 (1963)
(business purpose subsumed by device clause); But see Commissioner v. Wilson, 353,
F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965) (business purpose independent of device clause).
115. Id.
116. Cf. Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1965). (Court
denying tax advantages to corporation which had undertaken such distribution, for
reason that underlying reorganization had been for no valid business purpose).
117. E.g., R. LiPsEy & P. STEINER, EcONowcs 392-94 (6th ed. 1981).
118. E.g., Lyons, supra note 10, at 32. Shareholders receiving a bail-out of
profits and earnings "should be made to bear the burden of ordinary income rates."
119. See supra note 8.
120. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 381 (April 17, 1986).
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statutory interpretation is proper for two reasons. First, AT&T did
not control Pacific "immediately before distribution" as required by
section 368(c).' 2' AT&T did not own any Pacific stock immediately
before the distribution, let alone possess a controlling interest. AT&T
had already exchanged the Pacific stock for the PacTel stock. If
Pacific is not AT&T's controlled corporation under 368(c), inconsistency would arise to find PacTel controlled under section 355.' 2 On
its face, section 355 stipulates the same requirement, a corporation
controlled "immediately before distribution." 23 Second, section 355
distribution is a distribution of stock and securities of a "controlled
corporation.'2 AT&T did not distribute the Pacific stock to its
25
shareholders. The Pacific stock remained in PacTel's corporate pool.'
There was no distribution within the meaning Congress intended for
section 355.126
In light of this statutory construction, PacTel was the controlled
corporation. PacTel was controlled "immediately before the distri-

bution" under both sections 368(c) and

355.127

Further, the stock

actually distributed was the PacTel stock. Having established that
PacTel was the controlled corporation, PacTel must have a 5 year
28
history to qualify for nonrecognition treatment.'
But does this requirement pertain to the whole corporation or
each of its assets, specifically the Pacific stock? This is the heart of
the Dunn Trust decision. The Tax Court held that PacTel was an
entity which must have a 5 year history.' 29 The court's analysis relied
almost exclusively on the fact that the Pacific stock remained in
PacTel's corporate solution. The court noted future evaluation problems if the Pacific stock was held to be "other property" under
section 355.130 However, the court had a stronger argument available
in holding that PacTel must have a 5 year history only as a whole
entity. To hold otherwise would result in a conflict between the 5
121. See supra note 93.
122. I.R.C. § 355(a)(D)(ii) (1986) makes a cross reference to § 368(c).
123. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1986).
124. I.R.C. § 355(a)(D) (1986).
125. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 383 (April 17, 1986).
126. See, Commissioner v. Levi, 136 F.2d 366, 367 (7th Cir. 1943): "Congress
used the word 'distribution' in its usual and commonly accepted sense. Websters (sic)
defines 'distribute' as meaning to 'divide among several or many; . ..apportion; a
lot."
127. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 381 (April 17, 1986).
128. See supra note 9.
129. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 381-82 (April 17, 1986).
130. Id. at 383.
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year rule and the active business rule. Section 355 requires both the
distributing corporation and the controlled corporation to be actively
conducting a trade or business throughout the 5 years prior to
distribution.131 PacTel was in the business of providing communication
services. PacTel was providing these services for 5 years prior to the
distribution.
The acquisition of the Pacific stock did not alter PacTel's prior
business activities. Following the acquisition, PacTel's communication
services were expanded to the Pacific customers but this expansion
did not alter the trade or business that PacTel was conducting. PacTel
had been in the same business throughout the 5 years prior to
distribution. 32 Thus in essence, to hold that the Pacific stock must
have its own 5 year history ignores the fact that PacTel has satisfied
the active business requirement of the statute. Given either rationale,
the result is still the same for the purposes of section 355. PacTel is
the controlled corporation requiring a 5 year history.
In Dunn Trust, the Tax Court centered its analysis on the
definition of a controlled corporation. This was unavoidable since the
Service's argument was that Pacific was the controlled corporation.
However, the court did look at the whole transaction itself. The court
answered the simple question of whether this was a bail-out. 33 The
Pacific stock was still in the corporate solution of PacTel, but then
again, AT&T acquired the PacTel stock by giving up the unaged
Pacific stock. But for the unaged Pacific stock, the ultimate distribution of the PacTel stock would not have occurred. Was this
sufficient grounds to treat the distribution of the PacTel stock as a
bail-out? The Tax Court accurately found that it was not. 34
By definition, a bail-out involves the distribution of earnings and
profits to shareholders without a corresponding decrease in their
equity interest.' 5 First, AT&T did not acquire the Pacific stock, stock
it would distribute to its shareholders with its liquid assets. Over 9701o
of the consideration furnished by AT&T was newly-issued shares of
its own stock. 136 Thus, AT&T's earnings would not be distributed to
its shareholders when they received the Pacific stock. Second, the
131. See supra note 9.
132. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 380 (April 17, 1986).
133. Id. at 383. See also Whitman, supra note 2, at 1211.Whitman stresses the
transactional analysis over the "sterile" definitional approach. The transactional
analysis asks the basic question: is this transaction a bail-out?
134. Id. at 383.
135. See supra note 4.
136. Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 383 (April 17, 1986).
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AT&T shareholders experienced a decrease in their percentage ownership in the company. If their original investment diminished because
of the Pacific purchase, the receipt of the PacTel stock simply returned
3 7 The court correctly found
them to their original economic status.
that AT&T stockholders did not engage in a bail-out. The distribution
of the PacTel stock to the AT&T stockholders was not a taxable
event.138
IV.

IMPLICATIONS:

The 5 year rule and the device clause were drafted as safeguards
39
against sham separations seeking a tax-free treatment. However the
5 year rule, by its concrete nature, has overstepped this purpose.
Businesses bought within the statutory period are automatically disqualified from section 355, whether the subsequent separation is a
bail-out or not. 14 Commentators have criticized the emphasis of this
rule over the transactional analysis, whether the particular separation
4
should be allowed tax-free treatment.' 1 The Dunn Trust decision is a
welcomed restriction to the overinflated 5 year rule.
Courts cannot ignore mandates of Congress's yet they can temper
their practical impact through strict construction of the individual
provisions. The Tax Court in Dunn Trust ameliorated the harshness
of the 5 year rule by limiting its application. The court would not
expand the 5 year rule to include an "indirect distribution" of the
to
Pacific stock. 142 The court reasoned that Congress did not intend
4
put direct distributions on a par with indirect distributions.'
While the Dunn Trust decision decreases potential disqualifications based only on an arbitrary cut-off, it also places more emphasis
on the device clause. 44 If more separations can avoid the 5 year rule
requirement, then the device clause will be used by courts to snare
sham separations. At the same time, more legitimate separations have
the potential of qualifying. This would be progressive change. The
137. Id. at 383 n.6. "When a corporation issues new stock in exchange for
adequate consideration, existing shareholders realize no increase in the value of their
individual holdings, because although the overall net worth of the company rises, so
does the number of shares outstanding."
138. Id. at 383.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See, Lee, supra note 3, at 253.
See, Lyons, supra note 10, at 32.
See generally, Whitman, supra note 2.
Dunn Trust, 86 T.C. (P-H) (qar) 86.46, at 383 (April 17, 1986).
Id. at 384 (emphasis in original).
See supra note 18.
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device clause gets right to the essence of section 355: is this is a bail45
out?
Although the device clause sounds like the right tool for the right
job, it may have its drawbacks. As arbitrary as the 5 year rule is, it
does have the attribute of certainty which the device clause lacks.'4
The device clause lacks certainty because of its nature. Whether a
distribution is being used principally as a device to avoid federal taxes
is a factual question and depends on a matter of degree when other
business purposes are present. The device clause also lacks predictability because it, like any other term under section 355, lacks an
adequate definition. 47 Like any other term under section 355, the
device clause will have to be defined through litigation. Perhaps Dunn
Trust has opened the door for more use of the device clause in section
355 cases and thus more opportunity to refine it. Hopefully, the
refinement will decrease the uncertainty of the device clause yet not
to the extent that it becomes as rigid as the 5 year rule.
Moreover, the decision in Dunn Trust is significant in light of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Since the preferential tax on capital
gains has now been eliminated,'4 nonrecognition treatment may be
even more attractive. It is a fair assumption that taxpayers will always
minimize their taxes. 49 If capital gain is no longer a way for shareholders to minimize their taxes, then other means will be utilized.
Arguably, the potential for bail-outs should increase. Given a choice
between a current or deferred tax, the shareholder would opt for the
deferral. 50 The goal of the ball-out would merely shift from obtaining
capital gains over ordinary income to qualifying for nonrecognition
rather than being currently taxed.'' In a nonrecognition distribution,
the shareholder would still have control over the timing and amount
of tax. The shareholder could postpone the sale of the distributed
stock to a taxable year in which the sale would result in a lesser tax
consequence. For example, a shareholder could delay the sale until a
year in which he/she incurred a capital loss, then sell the quantity of
§ 355 stock which would off-set the loss. 5 2 Or, a shareholder could
145. See supra note 133.
146. E.g., Isabel A. Elliott v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 283, 291 (1959). The
distribution of stock was denied nonrecognition as the control corporation was only
created four years and four months prior to the distribution.
147. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 19.
149. E.g., Schneider, supra note 4, at
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. I.R.C. § 302 (1986).
-.
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sell in a year in which he/she had little income, thereby having the
proceeds taxed at a lower tax rate.
If the tax climate has conceivably created more attempts for §
355 distributions and the Dunn Trust decision qualifies potentially
more separations for nonrecognition treatment, then the use of the
device clause is paramount to curb bail-outs. Although the device
clause is preferable to strict requirements such as the 5 year rule, it is
still a nebulous standard. Only future litigation will tell whether the
device clause will be a lamb or a lion. At least the Dunn Trust decision
has shifted the analysis in the right direction.
V.

CONCLUSION:

Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
if a shareholder receives stock of a controlled corporation from a
distributing corporation, under certain conditions, no gain or loss will
be recognized on such stock. One inescapable requirement is that the
controlled subsidiary must have been actively conducting business for
5 years prior to the distribution. This bench-mark is an arbitrary
measure meant to distinguish legitimate separations from sham separations seeking tax-free treatment. Unfortunately, some legitimate
separations cannot meet this requirement. A better test to distinguish
between sham and legitimate separations is the device clause. The
device clause asks the question: Is this a sham separation?
Historically, courts have emphasized the 5 year rule over the
device clause since the 5 year period is a threshold requirement. In
Dunn Trust, the court refused to expand the 5 year rule to encompass
indirect distributions. By narrowing the application of the 5 year
rule, the Tax Court shifted emphasis to the device clause. Perhaps
the Dunn Trust decision has opened the door for more use of the
device clause in § 355 cases. Only application will define the true
parameters of the device clause. This refinement is paramount as
the device clause will ultimately determine the flexibility for future
separations under § 355.
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